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ABSTRACT
Data confidentiality is an important requirement for clients
when outsourcing databases to the cloud. Trusted execution
environments, such as Intel SGX, offer an efficient, hardware-
based solution to this cryptographic problem. Existing so-
lutions are not optimized for column-oriented, in-memory
databases and pose impractical memory requirements on
the enclave. We present EncDBDB, a novel approach for
client-controlled encryption of a column-oriented, in-memory
databases allowing range searches using an enclave. EncDB-
DB offers nine encrypted dictionaries, which provide different
security, performance and storage efficiency tradeoffs for the
data. It is especially suited for complex, read-oriented, an-
alytic queries, e.g., as present in data warehouses. The
computational overhead compared to plaintext processing is
within a millisecond even for databases with millions of en-
tries and the leakage is limited. Compressed encrypted data
requires less space than a corresponding plaintext column.
Furthermore, the resulting code — and data — in the en-
clave is very small reducing the potential for security-relevant
implementation errors and side-channel leakages.
1. INTRODUCTION
Data warehouses are used by companies for business intel-
ligence and decision support. Such warehouses contain large
datasets and the underlying database management systems
(DBMS) are optimized for complex, read-oriented, analytic
queries. Outsourcing the data and query processing to the
cloud, more specifically to a Database-as-a-Service (DBaaS)
provider, can reduce costs, minimize maintenance efforts
and increase availability. However, companies are reluctant
to outsource their sensitive data to an untrusted DBaaS
provider due to possible data leakage, government intrusion,
and legal liability.
Cryptographic solutions can be a building block for an
encrypted cloud database. For instance, fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) [36] supports arbitrary computations on
encrypted data, but is still too slow for practical deploya-
bility [23, 37]. CryptDB [69] and Monomi [79] use multiple
encryption schemes, e.g., probabilistic encryption, determinis-
tic encryption, and order-preserving encryption [3, 12, 13, 54]
to perform different database functionalities. The encryption
schemes are layered and/or stored in parallel, introducing a
storage overhead, and careful query rewriting is necessary to
receive a result securely and efficiently.
An alternative approach is to build an encrypted database
based on a trusted execution environment (TEE). TEEs
provide an isolated, trusted environment for application code
and data known as an enclave. Intel SGX [4, 24, 47, 50, 51,
63], a TEE that is integrated into (most) modern Intel CPUs,
sparked a new wave of research in the direction of TEE-based
encrypted databases [9, 34, 39, 71, 31]. SGX enclaves provide
isolation against any other code, e.g., application code, other
enclaves, and the OS. However, current TEE approaches
assume an unrealistic size of enclaves [9, 71], do not provide
DBMS functionality [34], do not support persistency [31], or
leak the result of every primitive operation [39]. Also, these
solutions do not consider data compression to reduce the size
of large databases.
We propose and implement EncDBDB, a high-performance,
encrypted cloud database supporting analytic queries on large
datasets. We focus on a complex, required query type: range
queries. However, it is straightforward to also support e.g.,
count, aggregation, and average calculations. EncDBDB is
based on a column-oriented, dictionary encoding based, in-
memory database. Column-oriented data storage optimizes
the processing of analytic workloads [1, 14, 22, 78], in-memory
processing boosts the overall performance [27, 35, 57], and
dictionary encoding reduces the storage space overhead of
large (encrypted) datasets [2, 81]. Table 1 compares our
approach to the most relevant related work.
The main contributions of EncDBDB are:
• New architecture for search over encrypted data suit-
able for column-oriented, in-memory databases.
• Nine different encrypted dictionaries from which the
data owner can freely select on column granularity.
They provide different security (order and frequency
leakage), performance and storage efficiency tradeoffs.
The security ranges from the equivalent of determinis-
tic order-revealing encryption [17] to range predicate
encryption [60].
• Integration into MonetDB [15, 16, 49], an open source
DBMS. The enclave has only 1129 lines of code, reduc-
ing the potential for security-relevant implementation
errors and side-channel leakages. Query optimization
and auxiliary database functionalities, e.g., storage,
transaction, and database recovery management still
operate without changes to the original code.
• Sub-millisecond overhead for encrypted range queries
compared to plaintext range queries, on a real-world
customer database containing millions of entries.
• Less storage space required for a compressed, encrypted
column with the appropriate encrypted dictionary than
for a plaintext column with the same data.
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Table 1: Comparison of existing TEE based encrypted databases and EncDBDB. The overheads compare the respective
approach with a plaintext database. We present lower bounds of the overheads to the advantage of the approaches, taken from
the corresponding papers where available. More details are given in Section 7.
Approach Workload Protection Object
Comp-
ression
Overhead
LOC
Storage Performance
EnclaveDB [71] OLTP in-memory storage and query engine 7 N/A > 20 % ∼235,000
ObliDB [31] OLTP & OLAP data structure (array or B+-tree) 7 > 100 % > 200 % ∼10,000
StealthDB [39] OLTP primitive operators (e.g., ≤, ≥, +, ∗) 7 > 300 % > 20 % ∼1500
EncDBDB OLAP data structure (dictionaries) 3 < 100 % ∼ 8.9 % 1129
2. BACKGROUND
First, EncDBDB is a column-oriented, dictionary encoding
based, in-memory database. Second, a TEE, more specifically
Intel SGX, is used to protect and process data stored in the
database. Third, the database data are encrypted with
probabilistic authenticated encryption. We review these
three concepts in this section.
2.1 Column-oriented, Dictionary Encoding
based, In-memory Databases
In-memory database. Many commercial and open source
DBMS vendors offer in-memory databases for analytical data
processing, e.g., SAP HANA [72], Oracle RDBMS [67], and
MonetDB [64]. In-memory databases permanently store the
primary data in main memory and use the disk as secondary
storage. The major benefit of in-memory databases is the
lower access time of main memory compared to disk storage.
This speeds up every data access for which disk access would
be necessary. Additionally, it leads to shorter locking times
in concurrency control, thus fewer cache flushes and a better
CPU utilization. See [27, 35, 57] for more details.
Column-oriented, In-memory Database. One possi-
ble database storage concept is to store the data column-
oriented, i.e., successive values of each column are stored
consecutively, and surrogate identifiers are (implicitly) intro-
duced to connect the rows [1, 14, 22, 78]. The combination
of in-memory databases and column-oriented storage reduces
the number of cache misses, which strongly influences the in-
memory performance. All in-memory databases mentioned
above support column-oriented storage.
The main drawbacks of column-oriented storage are: (1)
so-called tuple-reconstruction is necessary to re-assemble a
projection involving multiple attributes and (2) inserts and
updates of a tuple are written to non-contiguous storage
locations. These problems are not severe in the context of
analytical applications, e.g., data warehousing and business
intelligence, because analytical queries often involve a scan
on a significant amount of all tuples, but only a small subset
of all columns [14, 56]. Additionally, bulk loading of data
is often used in this context and complex, long, read-only
queries are executed afterwards [46, 78]. An example query is
a report on total sales per country for products in a certain
price range. Only the few columns that are involved in
the query have to be loaded and they can be processed
sequentially, which is beneficial as it decreases cache misses
of CPUs.
Column-oriented, Dictionary Encoding based, In-
memory Databases. The three commercial DBMSes men-
tioned above and many other databases use data compres-
sion mechanisms to exploit redundancy within data [2, 81].
Abadi et al. [2] study multiple database compression schemes,
e.g., null suppression, run-length encoding and dictionary
encoding, and show how they can be applied to column-
oriented databases. According to the authors, column-orien-
ted databases particularly profit from compression. In this
paper, we only consider dictionary encoding, because it is
the most prevalent compression used in column-oriented
databases [2].
Throughout this paper, we say a tuple T contains |T |
values, i.e., T = (T 0, . . . , T |T |−1). We use v ∈ T as a
shorthand for a value v that is contained in the tuple T .
The idea of dictionary encoding is to split a column C = (
C0, . . . , C|C|−1) into two structures: a dictionary D and an
attribute vector AV . The dictionary D = (D0, . . . , D|D|−1)
is filled with all values v ∈ C and every v has to be present
in D at least once. The index i of a dictionary entry Di is
called the ValueID (vid) that corresponds to this value. The
attribute vector AV = (AV 0, . . . , AV |AV |−1) is constructed
by replacing all values v ∈ C with one vid that corresponds
to v. As a result, AV contains |AV | = |C| ValueIDs. The
index j of an entry AV j is called its RecordID (rid). un(C)
denotes the set of unique values in C, |un(C)| the amount
of unique values, oc(C, v) the occurrence indices of a unique
value v in C, and |oc(C, v)| the number of occurrences of v.
We define the correctness of a column split as follows:
Definition 1 (Split Correctness). Given a column
C, we say that a split of C into a dictionary D and an
attribute vector AV is correct if i is the ValueID stored in
the attribute vector at position j and Di equals Cj, i.e.,
∀j ∈ [0, |AV | − 1] : i = AV j ∧Di = Cj.
In Figure 1, we present a split example based on a small
first name column (FName). For instance, Jessica was inserted
in the dictionary at the ValueID 1 and all positions from the
original column that contained Jessica are replaced by this
ValueID in the attribute vector (see RecordIDs 0, 2 and 3).
The set of unique values is un(C) = {Hans, Jessica,Archie}
and Archie occurs at the positions oc(C,Archie) = {1, 5}.
FName
Jessica 
Jessica 
Archie
Archie
Jessica 
Hans
RecordID
4
5
3
2
1
0
Value
Hans
Archie
Jessica 
ValueID
1
2
0
ValueID
1
0
2
2
1
1
RecordID
4
5
3
2
1
0
Column Dictionary Attribute Vector
Figure 1: Dictionary encoding example
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Note that a split column requires less space than the
original column in many cases, because a ValueID of i Bits
is sufficient to represent 2i different values in the attribute
vector and the (variable-length) values only have to be stored
once in the dictionary. For instance, a column that contains
10,000 strings of 10 characters each, but only 256 unique
values, requires 256 · 10 B for the dictionary and 10,000 · 1 B
for the attribute vector. In total, dictionary encoding reduces
the required storage from 100,000 B to 12,650 B. Dictionary
encoding has the best compression rate if columns contain
few unique but many frequent values, because every value
has to be stored only once. The real-world data used for
our evaluation (see Section 6.3) and other studies [65, 58]
show that this is a characteristic of many columns in data
warehouses. High compression rates achieved by dictionary
encoding sparingly use the scarce resource of in-memory
databases — main memory.
A search for all entries falling in a range R is performed
in two steps if dictionary encoding is used: a dictionary
search followed by an attribute vector search. The dictionary
search checks for every v ∈ D if it falls into R and returns
the matching ValueIDs (vid). The attribute vector search
linearly scans the attribute vector searching for every value
v ∈ vid and returns a list of matching RecordIDs (rid). This
operation is parallelizable with a speedup expected to be
linear in the number of threads.
In the example of Figure 1, a search for R = [Archie,Hans]
in the dictionary returns vid = {0, 2}. Searching these
ValueIDs in the attribute vector returns rid = {1, 4, 5}.
2.2 Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
Intel SGX is an instruction set extension that is available
in Intel Core processors since the Skylake generation and
in Intel Xeon processors since the Kaby Lake generation,
making it a widely available TEE. It provides a secure,
isolated processing area, called enclave, which guarantees
confidentiality and integrity protection to code and data in
it, even in an untrusted environment. We present SGX’s
features used by EncDBDB. See [4, 24, 47, 50, 51, 63] for
more details.
Memory Isolation. SGX v2 dedicates 128 MB of the
system’s main memory (RAM) for the so-called Processor
Reserved Memory (PRM). All code and data in the PRM is
encrypted while residing outside of the CPU, and decrypted
and integrity checked when the data is loaded into the CPU.
All other software on the system, including privileged soft-
ware such as OS, hypervisor, and firmware, cannot access
the PRM. Only about 96 MB of the PRM can be used for
enclave code and data, even if multiple enclaves are present.
The OS can swap out enclave pages and SGX ensures in-
tegrity, confidentiality and freshness of swapped-out pages,
but paging comes with a major performance overhead.
Every program using SGX consists of an enclave and an
untrusted part. The untrusted part is executed as an ordinary
process within the virtual memory address space and the
enclave memory is mapped into the virtual memory of the
untrusted host process. This mapping allows the enclave to
access the entire virtual memory of its host process, while
the host process can invoke the enclave only through a well-
defined interface.
Attestation. SGX has a remote attestation feature,
which allows verification of code integrity and authentic-
ity on a remote system. This is done by hashing (called
measuring in SGX terminology) the initial code and data
loaded into the enclave. The authenticity of the measurement,
as well as the fact that the measurement originates from a
benign enclave, is ensured by SGX’s attestation feature (refer
to [4] for details). The measurement can be provided to an
external party to prove the correct creation of an enclave.
Furthermore, the remote attestation feature allows establish-
ment of a secure channel between an external party and an
enclave. This secure channel can be used to deploy sensitive
data, e.g., cryptographic keys, directly into the enclave.
2.3 Probabilistic Authenticated Encryption
A probabilistic authenticated encryption (PAE) scheme pro-
vides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of encrypted
data. PAE Enc takes a secret key SK, a random initialization
vector IV and a plaintext value v as input and returns a
ciphertext c. PAE Dec takes SK and c as input and returns v
iff v was encrypted with PAE Enc under the initialization vec-
tor IV and the secret key SK. AES-128 in GCM mode [29]
can be used as a PAE implementation.
3. HIGH LEVEL DESIGN OF ENCDBDB
In this section, we give an overview of EncDBDB’s setup
and query phase, followed by the considered attacker model.
3.1 EncDBDB Overview
EncDBDB provides nine encrypted dictionaries and also
supports plaintext dictionaries. In the setup phase, one of
these is selected per column of the data owner’s dataset.
The selection determines how each column is split into a
dictionary and an attribute vector. All values in encrypted
dictionaries are encrypted with PAE under a key determined
by the data owner. The encrypted dictionaries provide dif-
ferent tradeoffs regarding security, performance, and storage
efficiency. EncDBDB is able to process all dictionary types
together, even if they are mixed in one table. For brevity,
plaintext dictionaries are not discussed any further, but per-
formance measurements are shown in the evaluation section.
The data owner’s dataset is deployed at a DBaaS provider
that supports Intel SGX (see Figure 2). SGX can be replaced
by any other TEE that provides the required capabilities
such as integrity and confidentiality protection of code and
data, remote attestation, and secure data provisioning. Ad-
ditionally, the data owner’s secret key (SKDB) is deployed
into the SGX enclave that is part of the DBMS and to a
trusted proxy.
DBaaS Provider
Untrusted
Enclave
DBMS
Proxy
ApplicationTrusted
Data Owner
DB
Figure 2: High level design of EncDBDB
After this setup, the query phase starts, and an application
can send queries to the DBaaS offering. These queries are
routed through the proxy, where all values are encrypted with
PAE and forwarded to the DBMS, which processes the queries
in a pipeline. The pipeline outputs encrypted range queries
on individual columns. The enclave is used for protected
dictionary searches. Attribute vector searches and all other
DBMS functionality are performed outside of the enclave.
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The DBMS combines the individual results into a total result
and returns it to the proxy. At the proxy, the total result
is decrypted and forwarded to the application for which the
whole process is transparent.
We introduce the encrypted dictionaries in detail in Sec-
tion 4.1. In Section 4.2, we provide an in-depth description of
how the encrypted dictionaries are used as the main building
block for implementing a protected DBMS that supports
auxiliary DBMS functions. In Section 4.3, we explain how
EncDBDB can handle data insertions, deletions, and up-
dates.
3.2 Attacker Model
Our attacker model considers the data owner, application
and proxy as trusted. On the server side, we assume an
honest-but-curious attacker, i.e., a passive attacker who fol-
lows the protocol, but tries to gain as much information as
possible.
The enclave code and data is protected by the TEE. The
code is assumed not to have intentional data leakage. How-
ever, the attacker can observe all other software running
at the DBaaS provider, e.g., the OS, the firmware and the
DBMS. As a result, the attacker has full access to data
stored on disk and main memory, and she is able to observe
the access pattern to them. Additionally, she can track all
communication between the enclave and resources outside of
it, and all network communication between the proxy and
the DBMS. Note that this includes the incoming queries in
which only the data values are encrypted.
Various research studies have shown that SGX is vulnerable
to various side-channel attacks, e.g., cache attacks [19], timing
attacks [80] or page faults [82]. Other researchers have
presented solutions to these problems. For instance, how
to mitigate the page fault side-channel [76], how to detect
side-channels [21] and how to protect against cache-based
side-channels [42]. We consider the side-channel exploitation
and protection as an orthogonal problem and thus do not
consider them in this work. However, we design our system
to have minimal enclave code and therefore, the protections
should be straightforward to integrate. Hardware attacks
and Denial of Service (DoS) are out of scope.
We assume that the attacker targets each database column
independently, i.e., she does not use correlation information
to target columns. It remains future work to evaluate how
decorrelation of columns protects the database in practice.
4. ENCDBDB DESIGN
In this section, we continue the description of EncDBDB,
which was already introduced in Section 3.1. We first explain
the nine encrypted dictionaries that EncDBDB supports and
then elaborate how they can be used to build an encrypted
DBMS.
4.1 Encrypted Dictionaries
The encrypted dictionaries differ from each other in two
dimensions — repetition and order of values in D — with
three options each (see Table 2). The repetition options are:
frequency revealing, frequency smoothing, and frequency
hiding. The order options are: sorted lexicographically,
sorted and rotated around a random offset, and unsorted.
An encrypted dictionary is defined by one option from each
dimension, which leads to nine data structures with different
security, search time and storage efficiency features.
Table 2: Characteristics of encrypted dictionaries
order options
sorted rotated unsorted
re
p
et
it
io
n
o
p
ti
o
n
s frequency revealing ED1 ED2 ED3
frequency smoothing ED4 ED5 ED6
frequency hiding ED7 ED8 ED9
The idea of the repetition options is to increase the number
of repetitions of dictionary values from frequency revealing
to frequency hiding. This directly influences two features
of the resulting encrypted dictionaries (see Table 3): the
security feature frequency leakage and dictionary size (|D|).
Note that |D| is fixed for frequency revealing and frequency
hiding. For frequency smoothing, the worst-case size is |AV |,
but we give the average size, which depends on a configurable
parameter bsmax.
Table 3: Security feature frequency leakage and dictionary
size of repetition options
repetition options frequency leak. dictionary size |D|
frequency revealing full |un(C)|
frequency smoothing bounded ∼∑v∈C 2·|oc(C,v)|1+bsmax
frequency hiding none |AV |
The order options also determine two features of the en-
crypted dictionaries (see Table 4). First, they determine
the security feature order leakage, i.e., the information an
attacker with memory access can learn about the plaintext
order of the encrypted values in D. Second, they determine
the search time combining the dictionary and attribute vec-
tor search time. The dictionary search time depends on |D|
and the search algorithm, which differs for the order options.
The attribute vector search time depends on the amount of
ValueIDs returned by the dictionary search, because AV has
to be scanned for them.
Table 4: Security feature order leakage and search time of
order options
order options order leakage search time
sorted full O(log|D|) +O(|AV |)
rotated bounded O(log|D|) +O(|AV |)
unsorted none O(|D|) +O(|AV | · |vid|)
Three operations differ for the nine encrypted dictionar-
ies: (1) creation of the encrypted dictionaries, (2) dictionary
search inside the enclave at the DBaaS provider, and (3)
attribute vector search in the untrusted realm at the DBaaS
provider. In the next sections, we denote the correspond-
ing operations as (1) EncDB, (2) EnclDictSearch, and (3)
AttrVectSearch, and describe these operations in detail.
As mentioned before, an encrypted dictionary is defined
by an order and a repetition option. We start by describing
the frequency revealing algorithm and then explain how it is
combined with the three order options to instantiate ED1–
ED3. Then, we do the same for the frequency smoothing
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(a) Column C
Value
Ella
Archie
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(b) ED1
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3
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1
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(c) ED2 with rndOffset = 3
Value
Archie
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0
3
2
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3
1
0
1
RecordID
0
5
4
3
2
1
Dictionary Attribute Vector
(d) ED3
Figure 3: (a) example column C processed with (b) ED1, (c) ED2, and (d) ED3 before encryption
algorithm and its combinations (ED4–ED6) followed by the
frequency hiding algorithm and its combinations (ED7–ED9).
We always assume a closed search range. Open or half-open
ranges can be handled trivially, however we omit the details
to provide a concise description.
Frequency revealing
In the frequency revealing algorithm, the split of a column
C is performed by inserting each unique value v ∈ un(C)
into D exactly once at an arbitrary position, i.e., |D| =
|un(C)| ∧ ∀v ∈ un(C) : v ∈ D. The ValueIDs in AV are set
such that the split is correct according to Definition 1.
The frequency revealing algorithm provides the best com-
pression rate that is possible with dictionary encoding and
thus is the most storage efficient repetition option. However,
an attacker can learn the frequency of each value Dj ∈ D
by counting the occurrences of j in AV . This is still true if
each v ∈ D is encrypted with probabilistic authenticated en-
cryption. Therefore, the three frequency revealing encrypted
dictionaries presented next have full frequency leakage.
ED1. For each column C that is protected with ED1,
EncDB 1 performs the split operation according to the fre-
quency revealing algorithm, sorts the values v ∈ D lexico-
graphically and adjusted the ValueIDs in AV such that the
split is correct. Afterwards, EncDB 1 derives SKD from the
data owner’s secret key SKDB , the table name, and the
column name. It then encrypts all values v individually with
PAE Enc under SKD and a random initialization vector IV .
The resulting dictionary containing encrypted values is de-
noted as eD. Figure 3 (a) presents an example column C and
Figure 3 (b) the result of ED1 before PAE Enc is performed.
ED1 has full order leakage because an attacker knows the
plaintext order of the encrypted values c ∈ eD.
ED1’s dictionary search (EnclDictSearch 1), which is ex-
ecuted in the enclave at the DBaaS provider, is presented in
Algorithm 1. The function gets an encrypted range τ and an
encrypted dictionary eD as input. First it derives SKD and
decrypts the start and end of the range individually. Then,
one leftmost and one rightmost binary search is performed
to find the dictionary indices where the searched range starts
(vidmin) and ends (vidmax). All dictionary values are en-
crypted and stored in untrusted memory. Thus, the binary
searches load the values into the enclave individually, decrypt
them there, and compare them with the search value. The
number of load, decrypt and compare operations is logarith-
mic in |D|. In our implementation we use the result of the
searches, and whether or not a value was found, to handle
cases in which a value is not present. This detail is omitted
for brevity in Algorithm 1.
Note that only very small, constant enclave memory is
required for EnclDictSearch 1 as well as for the EnclDict-
Algorithm 1 EnclDictSearch 1(τ , eD)
1: SKD = DeriveKey(SKDB , colName, tabName)
2: R = (Rs, Re) =
(
PAE Dec(SKD, τs), PAE Dec(SKD, τe)
)
3: vidmin = BinarySearchLM(eD,Rs)
4: vidmax = BinarySearchRM(eD,Re)
5: return vid = (vidmin, vidmax)
Search operations of all other encrypted dictionaries. Espe-
cially, the required enclave memory is independent of |D|.
Afterwards, AttrVectSearch 1 is executed in the untrusted
realm at the DBaaS provider. It linearly scans the corre-
sponding AV , checks if the ValueIDs fall between vidmin
and vidmax, and returns the matching RecordIDs (rid), i.e.,
rid = {i |AV i ∈ AV ∧ AV i ∈ [vidmin, vidmax]}. This oper-
ation is parallelizable with a speedup expected to be linear
in the number of threads.
ED2. The idea of the rotated algorithm, which is used in
ED2, is to sort and randomly rotate D. EncDB 2 executes
the frequency revealing algorithm, sorts the values in D lexi-
cographically, performs a random rotation of D as explained
in the following paragraph, adjusts the ValueIDs in AV such
that the split is correct, and encrypts all v ∈ D with PAE
under SKD and a random IV , resulting in eD.
EncDB 2 generates a random offset (rndOffset) and rotates
D by this value. More formally, let D′ be the sorted dictio-
nary, then D = (Di |Di = D′j ∧ i = (j + rndOffset) mod
|D′|). EncDB 2 encrypts rndOffset with PAE under SKD and
a random IV , and attaches the resulting encRndOffset to
eD.
Figure 3 (c) illustrates an example with rndOffset = 3
(before encryption). For instance, “Jessica” has the ValueID
2 in a sorted dictionary D′. After the rotation, the ValueID
is 1 = (2 + 3) mod 4.
The order leakage is bounded, because an attacker who
can observe no or a limited number of queries, does not know
where the smallest and largest values are stored in eD. The
idea of modular order-preserving encryption in the context
of probabilistic encryption was introduced in [55].
The processing inside the enclave (EnclDictSearch 2) is
illustrated in Algorithm 2. First, SKD is derived, and the
encrypted range τ and encRndOffset are decrypted with it.
Then, a special variant of binary search, which is explained in
the next paragraph, is called to search the start and the end
of the range — vidmin and vidmax. These indices have to be
processed further inside of the enclave, because the positions
of the indices relative to rndOffset define the final result of
the dictionary search and rndOffset is sensitive. There are
three possibilities: both indices are lower than rndOffset ;
both are greater than or equal to rndOffset ; or vidmin is
above and vidmax is below rndOffset . In the first and second
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case, the results are in the range
(
vidmin, vidmax
)
. In the
third case, there are again two possibilities: vidmin does
or does not equal |eD|. In the first case, the range start
was not found in eD, but it is higher than the last value
in it. Accordingly, all results are in the range
(
0, vidmax
)
.
Otherwise, the results are split in a lower range
(
0, vidmax
)
and an upper range
(
vidmin, |eD| − 1
)
. We always return
a dummy range if the result is only one range to simplify
attribute vector search.
Algorithm 2 EnclDictSearch 2(τ , eD, encRndOffset)
1: SKD = DeriveKey(SKDB , colName, tabName)
2: R = (Rs, Re) =
(
PAE Dec(SKD, τs), PAE Dec(SKD, τe)
)
3: rndOffset = PAE Dec(SKD, encRndOffset)
4: vidmin = BinSearchSpecialS(eD,Rs,rndOffset ,SKD)
5: vidmax = BinSearchSpecialE(eD,Re,rndOffset ,SKD)
6: vid = ∅
7: if (vidmin < rndOffset & vidmax < rndOffset) |
8: (vidmin > rndOffset & vidmax > rndOffset) then
9: vid = {(vidmin, vidmax), (− 1,−1)}
10: else if vidmin > rndOffset & vidmax < rndOffset then
11: if vidmin ! = |eD| then
12: vid = {(0, vidmax), (vidmin, |eD| − 1)}
13: else
14: vid = {(0, vidmax), (− 1,−1) }
15: end if
16: end if
17: return vid
Algorithm 3 presents the details of the special binary search
with slightly different handling of the range start and end.
The goal is to perform a binary search that has an access
pattern that is independent of rndOffset . A binary search
that simply considers rndOffset during the data access would
leak rndOffset in the first round, which would completely
thwart the additional protection.
The algorithm uses a string encoding operation (ENCODE),
which converts string values of a fixed maximal length to
an integer representation preserving the lexicographical data
order. Each character is converted individually to an integer
of fixed length and the integers are concatenated to one
resulting integer. For instance, the encoding of “AB” would
be 3334 and “BA” would lead to 3433. The lexicographical
order is preserved by right padding the resulting integer to a
fixed maximal length. In many DBMSes, the values in each
column of a database have a fixed maximal length, which
is fixed either implicitly by the datatype, e.g., 32 bit for
INTEGER columns (in MySQL), or fixed explicitly with the
datatype, e.g., 30 characters for VARCHAR(30) columns. For
instance, ENCODE converts “AB” to the decimal 3334000000
for a VARCHAR(5) column.
Algorithm 3 first initializes the low and high value of
the search. A value r is determined by decrypting eD0
and executing ENCODE on it. Then, ENCODE is performed on
the maximum value that fits the column, which is implicitly
defined by the fixed maximal length of the column. ENCODE is
also executed on the search value (sV al), r is subtracted from
it and the result is taken modulo N . All values m accessed
during the search are loaded into the enclave, decrypted and
handled as sV al. Note that 0 is a possible value for rndOffset ,
because rndOffset is chosen uniformly at random between 0
and |D|−1. We omit the special handling for brevity. Overall,
the runtime of EnclDictSearch 2 is logarithmic in |D| and
Algorithm 3 BinSearchSpecialS/BinSearchSpecialE(eD,
sV al, rndOffset, SKD)
1: l = 0, h = |eD|
2: r = encode(PAE Dec(SKD, eD0))
3: N = encode(column maximum)
4: sV al = (encode(sV al)− r)%N
5: while l < h do
6: j = d(l + h)/2e
7: m = encode(PAE Dec(SKD, eDj))
8: cV al = (m− r)%N
9: if (cV al < sV al) (cV al <= sV al) then
10: l = j + 1
11: else
12: h = j
13: end if
14: end while
15: return (l) (l − 1)
the encoding introduces only a constant factor compared to
EnclDictSearch 1.
AttrVectSearch 2 linearly scans AV outside of the enclave
and checks if the values v ∈ AV fall in either range that was
returned by EnclDictSearch 2. The RecordIDs (rid) of the
matching values are returned by this operation.
ED3. This encrypted dictionary combines the repetition
option frequency revealing and the order option unsorted.
Accordingly, EncDB 3 performs the frequency revealing algo-
rithm and then shuffles the unique values v ∈ D randomly
resulting in an unsorted dictionary. Afterwards, the Val-
ueIDs in AV are set such that the split is correct and all
values v ∈ D are encrypted with PAE Enc under SKD and
a random IV . Figure 3 (d) shows an example for EncDB 3
before PAE Enc is performed. EncDB 3 trivially has no order
leakage.
ED3’s unsorted dictionary prevents the use of any search
with logarithmic runtime during EnclDictSearch 3. Instead,
a linear scan over all values c ∈ eD has to be performed (see
Algorithm 4). First, SKD is derived and used to decrypt
the encrypted search range τ . Then, the algorithm loads
each c ∈ eD into the enclave, decrypts c and checks if PAE
Dec(SKD, c) falls into R. The result is a list of all matching
ValueIDs vid.
Algorithm 4 EnclDictSearch 7(τ , eD)
1: SKD = DeriveKey(SKDB , colName, tabName)
2: R = (Rs, Re) =
(
PAE Dec(SKD, τs), PAE Dec(SKD, τe)
)
3: vid = ∅
4: for i = 0; i < |D|; i++ do
5: v = PAE Dec(SKD, eDi)
6: if Rs <= v <= Re then
7: vid.append(i)
8: end if
9: end for
10: return vid
AttrVectSearch 3 has to compare every v ∈ AV with
every u ∈ vid returned by EnclDictSearch 3. Thus, the
runtime complexity is O(|AV | · |vid|). However, integers are
compared in this case, which is a highly optimized operation
in most CPUs. Additionally, AttrVectSearch 3 is easily
parallelizable.
6
Frequency smoothing
The main problem of the frequency revealing algorithm is
that an attacker can learn the frequency of each value Dj ∈ D
even if the values are encrypted. The reason is that the un-
derlying plaintext values are present only once with a unique
ValueID. As a countermeasure, the frequency smoothing al-
gorithm bounds the frequency leakage by inserting plaintext
duplicates into D during the column split. The founda-
tion of this repetition option is the Uniform Random Salt
Frequencies method [70].
In more detail, the frequency smoothing algorithm executes
a parameterizable and probabilistic random experiment for
each unique value v ∈ un(C) to determine how often v should
be inserted into D (see Algorithm 5). We say that a plaintext
value v is split into multiple buckets and every bucket has a
specific size.
The number of occurrences of v in C (|oc(C, v)|) and a
maximal bucket size (bsmax) is passed to this experiment.
The random size for an additional bucket is picked from the
discrete uniform distribution U{1, bsmax} until the total size
is above |oc(C, v)|. The size of the last bucket is then set
such that the total size matches |oc(C, v)|. The experiment
returns the bucket sizes (bssizes) and how many buckets were
chosen (#bs). The frequency smoothing algorithm inserts
#bs repetitions of v into D. For each Ci ∈ oc(C, v), it
randomly inserts one of the #bs possible ValueIDs into AV i.
Each ValueID is used exactly as often as defined by bssizes.
As a result, the frequency leakage has a bound, because the
number of occurrences of each V alueID ∈ AV is guaranteed
to be between 1 and bsmax.
Algorithm 5 getRndBucketSizes(|oc(C, v)|, bsmax)
1: prevTotal = total = #bs = 0
2: bssizes = ∅
3: while total < |oc(C, v)| do
4: #bs += 1
5: rnd
$←− [1, bsmax]
6: bssizes.append(rnd)
7: prevTotal = total
8: total += rnd
9: end while
10: bssizes.last = |oc(C, v)| − prevTotal
11: return bssizes,#bs
bsmax can be chosen independently for each column. The
selection influences |D|, which impacts storage efficiency,
search time and frequency leakage. For instance, a large
bsmax leads to few repeating entries in D, which slightly
increases |D| compared to the frequency revealing algorithm.
This decreases the EnclDictSearch performance, because
more data needs to be loaded into the enclave, more decryp-
tions are performed, and more comparisons are necessary.
The performance of AttrVectSearch also decreases, because
more values have to be compared. A small bsmax leads to
many repetitions in D, which further increases |D| and the
search time. Yet, it leads to a low frequency leakage bound,
as each ValueID in AV is present at most bsmax times.
Next, we explain how the frequency smoothing algorithm
impacts the three order options, which were introduced in
detail before. We omit the discussion of order leakage as it
is independent of the repetition option.
ED4. EncDB 4 performs the split of C according to the
frequency smoothing algorithm and sorts all values in D lex-
icographically determining the order of repetitions randomly.
Then, it adjusts the ValueIDs in AV such that the split is
correct while considering how often each ValueID can be
used, which is defined by bssizes. Finally, EncDB 4 encrypts
all v ∈ D with PAE Enc under SKD and a random IV . Note
that this only leads to the same ciphertexts with negligible
probability, even if the plaintexts are equal.
EnclDictSearch 4 is equal to EnclDictSearch 1, because
leftmost and rightmost binary searches inherently handle
repetitions. The performance penalty compared to ED1
is small, because the binary search only slows down loga-
rithmically with a growing |D|. AttrVectSearch 4 equals
AttrVectSearch 1.
ED5. For this encrypted dictionary, EncDB 5 performs
the split of C according to the frequency smoothing algo-
rithm, rotates the ValueIDs as described in EncDB 2, sets the
ValueIDs in AV such that the split is correct (considering
bssizes), and encrypts all v ∈ D with PAE Enc under SKD
and a random IV . Figure 4 shows an example for ED5 with
bsmax = 3 and rndOffset = 1 not considering the encryption.
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Figure 4: Example for ED5 with bsmax = 3 and rndOffset = 1
without encryption
The special binary searches are more complex for ED5
than for ED2, because they have to handle a corner case:
the plaintext value of the last and first entry in D might be
equal and present more than two times (as in the example
in Figure 4). For the same reason, EnclDictSearch 5 has to
perform a more complicated postprocessing of vidmin and
vidmax compared to EnclDictSearch 2. The performance
penalty compared to ED2 is small, because the binary search
slows down logarithmically in |D|.
ED6. For columns that are protected with ED6, EncDB
6 splits C according to the frequency smoothing algorithm,
shuffles the values inD, sets the ValueIDs inAV such that the
split is correct (considering bssizes), and encrypts all v ∈ D
with PAE Enc under SKD and a random IV . EnclDict-
Search 6 is equal to EnclDictSearch 3 and AttrVectSearch
6 is equal to AttrVectSearch 3, but frequency smoothing
severely impacts the performance of these operations. The
reason is that the linear scan of EnclDictSearch 6 needs to
load, decrypt, and compare more values. Additionally, the
number of comparisons in AttrVectSearch 6 increases as
EnclDictSearch 6 potentially returns more values.
Frequency hiding
Now we discuss the frequency hiding algorithm, which pre-
vents frequency leakage. The idea is to add a separate entry
into D for every value in C, i.e., ∀i ∈ [0, |C| − 1] : Di = Ci.
As a result, every v ∈ C has |oc(C, v)| possible ValueIDs at
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Figure 5: EncDBDB process flow in detail
which v is stored. In turn, v ∈ AV is set to one of those
ValueIDs at random and every ValueID is used once. The
resulting dictionary encoding does not provide compression
anymore (|D| = |AV |), but the frequency of every ValueID
is perfectly equal, i.e., there is no frequency leakage.
ED7, ED8 and ED9. EncDB 7, EncDB 8 and EncDB
9 execute a split of C according to the frequency hiding
algorithm; sort, rotate, and shuffle D, respectively; adjusts
the ValueIDs in AV such that the split is correct and every
index in D is only used once in AV ; and encrypt all values
in D as described before.
Frequency hiding can be interpreted as a special case
of frequency smoothing with a bsmax of 1. Therefore, the
EnclDictSearch and AttrVectSearch operations are equal
as described for ED4, ED5, and ED6, and the advantage
and disadvantages are equivalent to the ones described for a
small bsmax.
4.2 EncDBDB in detail
In this section, we present how encrypted dictionaries are
used as foundation for an encrypted DBMS. In one possible
EncDBDB variant, the DBaaS provider is assumed trusted
for the initial setup. The data owner can upload plaintext
columns and the DBaaS provider can support the data owner
in choosing a proper encrypted dictionary for each column.
Afterwards, the DBaaS performs the appropriate column
splits and encryptions.
In the following, however, we discuss another variant in
which the DBaaS provider is untrusted also during the setup
(see Figure 5) and plaintext data never leaves the realm of
the data owner. We first describe the system setup, followed
by the processing during runtime.
Setup
1 The data owner defines a security parameter λ and gener-
ates a secret key SKDB = PAE Gen(1
λ).
2 The data owner uses SGX’s attestation feature to au-
thenticate the DBaaS server’s enclave and to establish a
secure connection to it (see Section 2.2 for details), which is
used to deploy SKDB to the enclave. Additionally, SKDB is
deployed at the proxy via a secure out-of-band mechanism.
3 The data owner takes its plaintext database PDB and
selects an encrypted dictionary for each column C ∈ PDB.
He performs EncDB as explained in the previous section for
each C according to the selected encrypted dictionary. Each
encrypted dictionary is encrypted with an individual key
SKD, which is derived from SKDB , the table name, and the
column name. The result is an encrypted database EDB.
4 As a last step of the setup, the data owner uses the
import functionality of the DBaaS provider to deploy EDB.
The storage management of the in-memory database stores
all data on disk for persistency and additionally loads it into
main memory.
Runtime
From this point on, the application can send an arbitrary
number of queries, which are processed as follows.
5 The application issues an SQL query Q to the proxy.
W.l.o.g. we assume that Q selects and filters only one col-
umn. The filter can be an equality select, an inequality
select, a greater than select (inclusive or exclusive), a less
than select (inclusive or exclusive) and a range select (in-
clusive or exclusive). The proxy converts all filters to a
range select with range R =
(
Rs, Re
)
. For instance, the
SQL query SELECT FName FROM t1 WHERE FName < 'Ella'
is converted to SELECT FName FROM t1 WHERE FName >=−∞
and FName < 'Ella' where −∞ is a placeholder for the
smallest domain value. Next, the proxy derives SKD using
SKDB , the table name, and the column name. Then, it
encrypts the range start and end (Rs and Re) with PAE Enc
using random initialization vectors. The resulting encrypted
query eQ of our SQL example is SELECT FName FROM t1
WHERE FName >= PAE Enc(SKD, IV1,−∞) and FName < PAE
Enc(SKD, IV2, 'Ella'). Because of the query conversion,
the untrusted DBaaS provider cannot differentiate query
types, and due the utilization of probabilistic authenticated
encryption, it also cannot learn if the values were queried
before. EncDBDB could also handle other query function-
alities, e.g., counts, aggregations, and average calculations,
but we do not consider these in this paper, because they
are easier to support than range searches. Other researchers
already presented encrypted joins [6, 45, 59] and it is an in-
teresting future work to support joins while using encrypted
dictionaries.
6 eQ is passed to the query pipeline of the DBaaS provider
that is specific to the underlying DBMS. For instance, the
query is processed by a query parser, a query decomposer and
a query optimizer. The query optimizer selects a query plan
and shares it with a query evaluation engine. It contains one(
eD,AV , τ
)
tuple that is derived from eQ, i.e., an encrypted
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dictionary, a plaintext attribute vector and an encrypted
range filter that has to be executed.
7 The query evaluation engine enriches eD with metadata:
the table name, the column name, and the column size. Then,
it passes τ and a reference to eD to the enclave.
8 The enclave performs the EnclDictSearch operation
corresponding to the encrypted dictionary of the filtered
column.
9 During this search the necessary dictionary entries are
loaded from the untrusted realm.
10 Finally, it returns a list of ValueIDs (vid) for which
the corresponding values fall into R.
11 The query evaluation engine performs the AttrVect-
Search operation corresponding to the encrypted dictionary
of the filtered column. These steps result in a list of Recor-
dIDs (rid).
12 rid is passed to a result renderer, which would use
rid to prefilter other columns in the same table if a filter
query should be executed on them. Additionally, rid would
be used if an unconditional select is performed on another
column. One encrypted result column eC is created by
undoing the split in eD and AV on all entries in rid, i.e.,
eC = (eDj | j = AV i ∧ i ∈ rid).
13 The result renderer enriches eC with column metadata
— table and column name — and passed eC back to the
proxy.
14 The proxy receives one encrypted column eC from the
DBaaS provider and uses the attached column metadata to
derive the column specific key SKD. Every entry in eC is
decrypted individually with SKD resulting in one plaintext
column C, which is passed back to the application.
Notably, only a very small part of the query processing
is done inside the trusted enclave and the required enclave
memory is very limited. There is no need to modify auxiliary
database functionalities such as persistency management,
multiversion concurrency control or access management. Still,
the complete processing is protected.
4.3 Dynamic Data
So far, we only discussed static data, which are prepared
by the data owner before being uploaded to an EncDB-
DB-enabled DBaaS provider. This is sufficient for most
analytical scenarios, because bulk loading of data is often
used in this context and complex, read-only queries are
executed afterwards [46, 78]. For other usage scenarios, we
present an approach on how EncDBDB can support dynamic
data, i.e., data insertions, deletions, and updates.
We propose to utilize a concept called delta store (or
differential buffer): the database — more specifically each
column — is split into a read optimized main store and a
write optimized delta store (see [33, 48, 78] for more details).
Updates in a column do not change existing rows. Instead,
all data changes are performed in the delta store. New values
are simply appended. Updated values are handled using a
validity vector for the two storage concepts. This vector
stores stores a flag for each entry indicating whether or not it
is valid. Deletions are realizable by an update on the validity
bit. The overall state of the column is the combination of
both stores. Thus, a read query becomes more complex: it
is executed on both stores normally and then the results are
merged while checking the validity of the entries. The delta
store should be kept orders of magnitude smaller than the
main store to efficiently handle read queries. This is done by
periodically merging the data of the delta store into the main
store. Hu¨bner et al. describe different merging strategies [48].
For EncDBDB, any encrypted dictionary can be used for
the main store and ED9 should be employed for the delta
store. New entries can simply be appended to a column
of type ED9 by reencrypting the incoming value inside the
enclave with a random IV . A search in this delta store is done
by performing the linear scan as defined by EnclDictSearch
9. As a result, neither the data order nor the frequency
is leaked during the insertion and search. A drawback of
ED9 is that it has a high memory space overhead and low
performance. However, the periodic merges mitigate this
problem. The enclave handles the merging process as follows:
First, it reencrypts every value in D. Then, the columns
with the rotated order option are randomly rerotated and
columns with the unsorted order option are reshuffle. The
process has to be implemented in a way that does not leak
the relationship between values in the old and new main
store, e.g., with oblivious memory primitives [73, 83].
5. IMPLEMENTATION
For our experiments we implemented a prototype based
on MonetDB, an open-source, column-oriented in-memory
DBMS [15, 49, 16]. MonetDB focuses on read-dominated,
analytical workloads and thus perfectly fits our use case. It
is a commercial relational DBMS, which exploits the large
main memory of modern computer systems for processing
and it uses disk storage for persistency.
MonetDB uses a variant of dictionary encoding for all
string columns. The attribute vector contains offsets to the
dictionary, but the dictionary contains data in the order
it is inserted (for non-duplicates). The dictionary does not
contain duplicates if it is small (below 64 kB) and a hash table
and collision lists are used to locate entries. The collision
list is only used as long as the dictionary does not exceed a
certain size. As a result, the dictionary might store values
multiple times.
The front-end query language of MonetDB is SQL. We
implemented the nine encrypted dictionaries as SQL data
types in the frontend and new internal data types in the
backend. The encrypted dictionaries can be used in SQL
create table statements like any other data type, e.g., CREATE
TABLE t1 (c1 ED7, c2 ED5, ...). We further split each
dictionary into a dictionary head and dictionary tail. The
dictionary tail contains variable length values that are en-
crypted with AES-128 in GCM mode. The values are stored
sequentially in a random order. The dictionary head contains
fixed size offsets to the dictionary tail and the values are
ordered according to the selected encrypted dictionary. This
split is done to support variable length data while enabling
an efficient binary search.
For dictionary search, we pass a pointer to the encrypted
dictionary into the enclave and it directly loads the data
from the untrusted host process. Thus, only one context
switch is necessary for each query. Furthermore, all opera-
tions mentioned as easily parallelizable run parallel in our
implementation.
6. EVALUATION
In this section, we first provide security, storage and perfor-
mance evaluations of our nine encrypted dictionaries. Based
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on those, we conclude the section with a usage guideline
regarding the different encrypted dictionaries.
6.1 Security Evaluation
We start this section with a short discussion about enclave
code size. In general, small enclave code size improves the
security, as it reduces the probability of security-relevant
implementation errors, unintended leakages, and hidden mal-
ware. Our enclave is written in C and besides the Intel
SGX SDK (version 2.5), has only 1129 lines of code (LOC).
Only 412 of those LOC are written by us, the remainder are
taken up by a big integer library [61] used for the dictionary
search in ED2, ED5 and ED8. An enclave of this size can be
efficiently verified by a user of EncDBDB.
Now, we discuss the security of the nine encrypted dictio-
naries under the attacker model defined in Section 3.2, i.e.,
an honest-but-curious attacker that targets each column in-
dependently. The attacker passively examines the processing
of an encrypted dictionary eD and an attribute vector AV in
multiple rounds and she knows which encrypted dictionary
is used. First, we describe the security of ED1–ED3 and
ED7–ED9 by comparing them with security schemes known
in literature (see Table 5). A detailed analysis of the different
security definitions is beyond the scope of this paper as it is
highly data-dependent. However, we reference known attacks
in Table 5. Afterwards, we describe the security of ED4–ED6
relative to the other encrypted dictionaries. The relation
between the security provided by the different encrypted
dictionaries is summarized in Figure 6.
Table 5: Security of ED1–ED3 and ED7–ED9
freq.
leak.
order
leak.
comparable
security
known
attacks
ED1 full full ideal, determ. ORE [17] [11, 41]
ED2 full bounded MOPE [13] [11, 41, 62]
ED3 full none DET [10] [11, 66]
ED7 none full IND-FAOCPA [53] [40, 43, 52]
ED8 none bounded IND-CPA-DS [55] [40, 43, 52]
ED9 none none RPE [60] [40, 43, 52]
≤
≤
≤
≤
≤
≤
ED1
ED4
ED7
≤
≤
ED2
ED5
ED8
≤
≤
ED3
ED6
ED9
≤
≤
Figure 6: Relative security classification. EDX ≤ EDY means
that EDY provides the same or better security than EDX.
ED1 provides protection that is comparable to an ideal, de-
terministic variant of order-revealing encryption (ORE) [17].
It is an ORE as the order of the values is revealed by a public
“function” — the dictionary. It is ideal as neither eD itself
nor the encrypted values leak anything but the order. It is
deterministic as equal plaintexts have the same ciphertext.
The security of modular OPE (MOPE) [13] is a lower
bound for ED2. As MOPE, a column protected with ED2
only leaks the “modular” order of the values. MOPE uses
deterministic OPE and ED2 uses deterministic ORE, which
is more secure.
ED3 has no order leakage, but fully leaks the frequency of
all values. These security features are equivalent to a column
protected with deterministic encryption (DET) [10].
A column protected with ED7 is IND-FAOCPA secure [53].
Each ciphertext is present exactly once in eD and the assign-
ment of each AV entry to a ValueID is done with the help
of a “random coinflip” if a plaintext is encrypted multiple
times. Thus, the ValueIDs in eD form a randomized order
(see definition [53]) of the plaintext values.
ED8 protects a column with IND-CPA-DS security [55].
EncDB 8 and the Enc algorithm in [55] are different, but the
results of the algorithms are equal. Furthermore, EnclDict-
Search 8 matches the Search algorithm in [55]. Therefore,
the attacker learns the same information during processing.
The security of a column protected with ED9 is comparable
to the security of Range Predicate Encryption (RPE) [60]. As
defined by RPE’s plaintext privacy, EnclDictSearch 9 and
AttrVectSearch 9 only leak the information that an entry
falls into the search range. The “predicates” of ED9 are
plaintexts encrypted with PAE using a random initialization
vector, which provides RPE’s predicate privacy.
The frequency smoothing algorithm used by ED4 makes
the ciphertext frequencies close to uniform by randomly
selecting a frequency between 1 and bsmax, independent of
the plaintext frequency. As ED1 fully leaks the ciphertext
frequency and ED7 hides it completely, the security of ED4
lies between the security of ED1 and ED7. ED5 is more
secure than ED2 and is less secure than ED8 for the same
reason. The same is true for the triple ED6, ED3 and ED9.
The frequency smoothing algorithm is based on an algorithm
described in [70] and the authors only state that the last
frequency is not selected from the same distribution, which
might give an advantage to an attacker. An in-depth security
evaluation is an open research question.
6.2 Storage Evaluation
For our storage evaluation, we use a snapshot of a real-
world SAP customer’s business warehouse (BW) system.
The largest columns contain 168.7 million data values. To
evaluate the influence of the number of unique values to
our algorithms, we search for columns having the same size,
but different distributions. The dataset contains 30 large
columns with 10.9 million values. We present the results for
two extreme cases: C1 with 6.96 million unique values and
C2 with 13,361.
Table 6 presents the storage space requirements of different
variants. The plaintext file contains all plaintext values
present in the column without any compression. This file
is comparable to a plaintext column for which dictionary
encoding is not used. The encrypted file contains every value
from the plaintext file, but individually encrypted with PAE,
which has the same storage requirements as an encrypted
column without dictionary encoding. MonetDB’s storage
requirements are presented as a baseline.
The size of the plaintext files decreases from C1 to C2,
because the strings in these columns are 12 and 10 characters
long. As expected, we see that EncDBDB requires less
space if fewer unique values are present. We see that for C2
protected with ED1, ED2, or ED3, EncDBDB requires less
storage space than the plaintext file, i.e., less space than a
plaintext column without dictionary encoding. We also see
a further expected behavior: a smaller bsmax increases the
required storage space as more duplicates are stored.
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Table 6: Storage size of various variants
size C1 size C2
Plaintext file 136 MB 93 MB
Encrypted file 437 MB 392 MB
MonetDB 132 MB 43 MB
ED1/ED2/ED3 347 MB 22 MB
ED4/ED5/ED6, bsmax = 100 347 MB 56 MB
ED4/ED5/ED6, bsmax = 10 367 MB 123 MB
ED4/ED5/ED6, bsmax = 2 455 MB 331 MB
ED7/ED8/ED9 515 MB 475 MB
Note that the encrypted dictionaries are stored outside of
the enclave and individual values are loaded and decrypted.
Hence, the restricted enclave space does not constitute a
limitation for EncDBDB.
6.3 Performance Evaluation
For the performance evaluation, we use the same columns
introduced in the storage evaluation. Besides the original
columns, which we call full datasets, we sample datasets from
1 to 10 million records using the distribution and values of
the original columns.
MonetDB is used as one baseline measurement in our ex-
periments to compare ourselves against a commercial plain-
text DBMS. Additionally, we implement PlainDBDB — a
plaintext variant of EncDBDB. PlainDBDB uses the same
algorithms as EncDBDB, but the dictionaries are plaintext
and the algorithms are processed without an enclave. We use
PlainDBDB as a second baseline to evaluate the performance
overhead of encryption and SGX.
All experiments are performed with the confidential com-
puting offering of Microsoft Azure. We use a DC4s machine
with 16 GiB RAM and 4 vCPU cores of an Intel Xeon E-
2176G CPU @ 3.70GHz. All presented latencies measure the
processing time spent at the server excluding any network
delay or processing at the proxy or client. Our protocol runs
in one round and only encrypts the values in the query. Thus,
the communication and latency overhead compared to any
database in the cloud is negligible.
We use the term range size (RS) to describe how many
consecutive unique values from the dataset are searched in
a range query, i.e., if sorted(un(C)) = (v0, . . . , v|un(C)|−1)
is a sorted list of all unique values in C, then RS defines
the search range R = [vi, vi+RS−1] for i ∈ [0, |un(C)| −RS].
For every dataset and encrypted dictionary, we perform 500
random range queries with range sizes 2 and 100. The same
random range queries are executed for MonetDB, PlainDB-
DB, and EncDBDB. Note that the number of result rows
returned by the server is greater than RS if a value in the
search range is present multiple times in the column (see
Figure 7). For instance, 65,067 values are returned on average
for the full dataset of C2 and RS = 100.
ED1. The first and fourth column in Figure 8 (a) present
the latencies of ED1 for C1 and C2 and the range sizes 2
and 100. We highlight three observations from these plots.
First, EncDBDB and PlainDBDB outperform MonetDB
for both range sizes at both columns. The main reason is
that MonetDB’s attribute vector search performs a linear
number of string comparisons. In contrast, EncDBDB and
PlainDBDB require only a logarithmic number of string
Figure 7: Average number results returned by 500 random
range queries for columns C1 and C2 (95% confidence interval;
note that logarithmic y-axis distorts error bars)
comparisons in the dictionary search and a linear number of
integer comparisons in the attribute vector search. Second,
EncDBDB slows down if a column with equal size has less
unique values: the average latencies increase from 6.55 ms at
C1 to 8.79 ms at C2 for the full dataset and RS = 100. This
seems counterintuitive, because fewer unique values result
in a smaller dictionary size (|D|) improving the dictionary
search performance. However, only logarithmically fewer
decryptions and string comparisons are necessary in the
dictionary search, but many results are returned by the
attribute vector search (see Figure 7). As a result, the
DBMS has to spend more time for tuple-reconstruction, i.e.,
to build the result set based on the found RecordIDs and
the dictionary. Third, encryption is cheap: the average
latency overhead of EncDBDB compared to PlainDBDB is
0.36 ms (8.9 %). The overhead is minor for two reasons: (1)
as explained in the implementation section, we only requires
one context switch per column, which is negligible in the
overall latency and (2) we only use hardware-supported AES-
GCM encryption.
ED2. The second and fifth column in Figure 8 (a) present
the latencies of ED2. The main observation is that the latency
of EncDBDB and PlainDBDB is almost equal to the latency
of ED1 for the two columns. The only difference between ED1
and ED2 is that ED2 uses a special binary search and post-
processing of the resulting ValueIDs to handle the random
rotation, which introduces only a minor overhead. In fact,
the average latency overhead from ED1 to ED2 is 1.88 ms
for EncDBDB.
ED3. The third and sixth column in Figure 8 (a) show
the latencies of ED3. We observe that the average latencies
of PlainDBDB and EncDBDB, and their relative latency
differences, severely depend on the number of unique values
and the range size (RS). C2 has a smaller |D| than C1,
which decreases the latency of the linear dictionary search
and therefore the average latency of the query execution.
Additionally, a smaller |D| decreases the number of necessary
decryptions for EncDBDB and therefore the relative latency
difference between PlainDBDB and EncDBDB.
ED4, ED5, ED6. Figure 8 (b) presents the latency plots
for ED4–ED6. The latencies of MonetDB obviously do not
change. In the following, we focus on EncDBDB discussing
the latencies for ED4–ED6 compared to ED1–ED3. |D| is
larger for ED4–ED6, because the frequency smoothing algo-
rithm adds duplicates to D (bsmax = 10 in our experiments).
For ED4 and ED5, |D| influences the latency only logarith-
mically. Compared to ED1 and ED2, the average overheads
are only 0.002 ms and 0.11 ms, respectively. At ED6, the
dictionary search might return more than x ValueIDs for
the range size x as eD contains duplicate plaintexts. Every
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Figure 8: Average latencies of 500 random range queries for columns C1 and C2, which are protected by (a) ED1–ED3, (b)
ED4–ED6, and (c) ED7–ED9 (95% confidence interval not big enough to be visible)
returned value has to be compared to each attribute vector
entry. This increases the average latencies for the full dataset
at RS = 100 to 3.59 s and 10.64 s for C1 and C2.
ED7, ED8, ED9. Figure 8 (c) presents the latency plots
for ED7–ED9. We again focus on EncDBDB’s latency in
ED7–ED9 compared to ED1–ED3. Compared to ED1 and
ED2, the average overheads of ED7 and ED8 are 0.01 ms
and 0.23 ms, respectively. For the full dataset at RS = 100,
the average latencies of ED9 increase to 5.43 s and 60.82 s
for C1 and C2, respectively.
6.4 Usage Guideline
According to the security sensitivity of the data owner, an
encrypted dictionary can be select per column. If plaintext
is not an option, but the weakest security level is acceptable,
ED1 can be used. It has a small storage size and it is almost
as fast as PlainDBDB, even with different range sizes and
unique value amounts. If order leakage should be reduced
and a minor performance overhead is acceptable, ED2 is
preferable over ED1. If order leakage is not acceptable, a
column contains few unique values, and RS is small, ED3
has a practical overhead. For instance, EncDBDB’s average
latency overhead from ED1 to ED3 for C2 and RS = 2
is 6.87 ms. If the frequency leakage should be bounded,
ED5 can be used with a minor performance and storage
overhead compared to ED2. In many cases, ED5 is the best
security, latency and storage tradeoff among our encrypted
dictionaries. If security and latency are critical, but not
storage size, ED8 is the most favorable encrypted dictionary.
If security is the main objective of a column, ED9 should be
used.
7. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we compare EncDBDB to TEE-based en-
crypted databases, software-only encrypted databases, and
searchable encryption.
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7.1 TEE-based Encrypted Databases
In the following, we outline TEE-based approaches ranging
from large to small enclave sizes, and classify EncDBDB
accordingly.
Haven [9] and SCONE [7] are approaches to shield com-
plete applications on an untrusted system using SGX. Un-
modified applications should be executable inside an SGX
enclave, which could also be an off-the-shelf DBMS. How-
ever, a complete DBMS with millions of lines of code is prone
to security-relevant implementation errors or side-channel
leakages that could leak arbitrary data from the enclave.
Furthermore, no TEE on the market does support the huge
enclaves that are necessary for this concept.
Priebe et al. proposed EnclaveDB [71], a protected database
engine that uses a TEE to provide confidentiality, integrity,
and freshness for OLTP workloads. EnclaveDB has a large
TCB, as the tables, indices, metadata, query engine, trans-
action manager and stored procedures are loaded into the
TEE. The problems described for Haven and SCONE are
only slightly less severe. Especially, it still does not fit into
an existing TEE. Furthermore, all possible queries have to
be known in advance.
ObliDB [31] is an SGX based encrypted database that
hides the access pattern using oblivious query processing
algorithms on a B+-tree index or a linear array. The ad-
ditional protection introduces a latency overhead of 240%
compared to a plaintext database. Additionally, ObliDB
lacks transaction management and disk persistency.
HardIDX [34] uses SGX to protect one specific data struc-
ture, a B+-tree. Equality and range searches are done inside
the enclave and either the whole dataset at once or parts
on demand are loaded into enclave memory. Only a few
megabytes of enclave memory are necessary, and the enclave
has only a few lines of code. However, a B+-tree is only
presented as a building block of an encrypted database.
TrustedDB [8], Cipherbase [5], and StealthDB [39] use a
secure co-processor, an FPGA, and SGX as TEE, respectively.
They have the smallest enclave size by putting the execution
of individual operators, e.g., <, >, and = into a TEE. The
operations are executed on encrypted data and the results
are passed back. Only minor changes to an application (e.g.,
a database) are necessary as plaintext operations are just
replaced by protected operators. However, much information
is leaked as an attacker learns the result of each operation.
Only the processing of data structures, e.g., dictionaries or
B+-trees, is protected, but the authors do not consider the
inherently leaked information about the relation of individual
data values.
EncDBDB follows the same design philosophy as HardIDX:
keep the enclave code and the required enclave memory as
small as possible without leaking every individual decision
by processing a data structure inside an enclave. As a main
difference, we integrate EncDBDB into a DBMS.
7.2 Software-Only Encrypted Databases
Software only encrypted databases, such as CryptDB [69]
and Monomi [79], use property-preserving encryption for
efficient search. Every database functionality requires its
own encryption scheme with additional storage overhead.
For instance, deterministic encryption [10] is used to support
equality selects, and OPE [3, 12, 13, 54] allows range queries.
Naveed et al. [66] presented practical ciphertext-only attacks
on property-preserving encryption and further attacks fol-
lowed [28, 41]. In EncDBDB, equality and range queries are
handled by one encryption scheme with a small performance
and storage overhead. Some encrypted dictionaries of Enc-
DBDB are affected by these attacks, but the data owner can
freely choose a security level that fits his requirements and
all functionality is still supported.
Other approaches for a secure DBMS allowing range query
evaluation have been published: Cash et al. [20] introduce
a protocol that allows evaluation of boolean queries on en-
crypted data. Faber et al. [32] extend this protocol to support
range queries but either leak additional information on the
queried range or the result set contains false positives. Pap-
pas et al. [68] evaluate encrypted bloom filters using secure
multiparty computation. However, in order to achieve prac-
tical efficiency, they propose to split the server into two
non-colluding parties. Egorov et al. [30] presented ZeroDB, a
database that enables a client to perform equality and range
searches with the help of B+-trees. It uses an interactive
protocol requiring many rounds and thus is not usable for
network-sensitive cloud computing. EncDBDB does neither
require an additional party nor multiple rounds.
7.3 Searchable Encryption
Song et al. introduced the first searchable encryption
schemes for single plaintexts [77]. In order to improve per-
formance, Goh [38] and Curtmola et al. [25] introduced
encrypted (inverted) indices. However, these encryption
schemes can only search for keyword equality and not ranges.
The first range-searchable scheme by Boneh and Waters
encrypts every entry linear in the size of the plaintext do-
main [18]. The first scheme with logarithmic storage size per
entry in the domain was proposed by Shi et al. in [75]. Their
security model (match-revealing) is somewhat weaker than
standard searchable encryption. The construction is based
on inner-product predicate encryption which has been made
fully secure by Shen et al. in [74]. All of these schemes have
linear search time. Lu built the range-searchable encryption
from [74] into an index in [60], thereby enabling polylog-
arithmic search time. Hahn and Kerschbaum proposed a
construction building the search index incrementally [44].
By doing so, they still support amortized polylogarithmic
search time but increase security properties for non-queried
values. Demertzis et al. presented multiple constructions that
improve the constant factor of a range search [26]. However,
their construction without prohibitive storage cost and false
positives (Logarithmic-URC) requires already more than a
second to perform a range search within 100,000 values [34].
EncDBDB operates on millions of entries in milliseconds.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced EncDBDB — a high-perfor-
mance, encrypted cloud database supporting analytic queries
on large datasets. EncDBDB provides nine different en-
crypted dictionaries with distinct security, performance and
storage efficiency tradeoffs. Even with no frequency leakage
and bounded order leakage, range queries on datasets with
millions of encrypted entries are executed within milliseconds.
If some frequency leakage is acceptable, the compressed en-
crypted data requires less space than a plaintext column.
Moreover, the TCB of EncDBDB consists only of 1129 lines
of code exposing only a small attack surface. With those
features, EncDBDB is ideally suited for an entity that wants
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to outsource its sensitive data to an untrusted cloud environ-
ment.
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